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Using data from the 1994 through 1998 Consumer Expenditure Surveys, we compare household
spending on 16 different goods (food at home, food away from home, housing, transportation,
alcohol and tobacco, interest, furniture and appliances, home maintenance, clothing, utilities,
medical care, health insurance, entertainment, personal care, education, and other) for insured versus
uninsured households, controlling for total expenditures and demographic characteristics. The
analysis shows that the uninsured in the lowest quartile of the distribution of total expenditures
spend more on housing, food at home, alcohol and tobacco, and education than do the insured.  In
contrast, households in the top quartile of the distribution of total expenditures spend more on
transportation and furniture and appliances than do comparable insured households.  These results
are consistent with the idea that poor uninsured households face higher housing prices than do poor
insured households.  Further research is necessary to determine whether high housing prices can
help explain why some households do not have insurance.
Helen Levy
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Surprisingly little research has used an economic framework to analyze why some 
households do not have health insurance. Most of the literature on the uninsured emphasizes the 
demographic characteristics of the uninsured, rather than the economic constraints and choices 
that determine coverage. Since the purchase of health insurance is voluntary, coverage represents 
a tradeoff for households between insurance and other goods. The economics of this tradeoff are 
governed by income, prices and preferences. In this framework, understanding why people are 
uninsured means knowing to what extent each of these factors is responsible for the failure to 
purchase insurance. 
  The design of appropriate public policy toward the uninsured depends critically on 
understanding the relative importance of these three factors.  Suppose, for example, that the main 
reason some households do not have health insurance is that their incomes are low and they place 
basic needs like food and shelter ahead of health insurance.  The debate about covering the 
uninsured in this situation is fundamentally one about equity and redistribution; there is no 
market failure. If government intervention is called for, the appropriate policy response is to 
redistribute resources to the poor through either cash or in-kind transfers. 
Alternatively, suppose that most of the uninsured do not buy insurance because 
information asymmetries in the insurance market mean that they face actuarially unfair prices.  
Government intervention that corrects this market failure will increase social welfare. This 
inefficiency can be addressed using the same regulatory tools that are applied to the market for 
automobile insurance: mandates to purchase coverage combined with government-sponsored 
pools to insure high-risk individuals.  Proposals to mandate coverage also typically include  
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subsidies to low-income households, suggesting that policymakers believe some combination of 
prices and incomes to be responsible for the lack of health insurance coverage. 
Another way in which price differences may help explain lack of insurance coverage is if 
the uninsured face higher prices than the insured for other goods.  For example, suppose that 
some households face higher housing prices than do others. If housing is inelastically demanded 
with respect to its own price, spending on housing will increase in response to higher housing 
prices.  This price increase will also reduce spending on health insurance if the compensated 
cross-price elasticity is either negative or positive but smaller than the income effect associated 
with the price increase: that is, the two goods may be gross complements. To put it even more 
simply, the high cost of housing may squeeze health insurance out of the household’s budget.  If 
this is the reason why some households are uninsured, it is not obvious what policy response is 
most appropriate.  Clearly, regulation of health insurance markets misses the point.  Income 
redistribution or policies directed at the housing market would be more likely to affect the 
number of uninsured in this case. 
If prices and income cannot explain why some households do not have insurance, the 
only remaining explanation that economists have to offer is that preferences must differ. For 
example, one explanation for the fact that some households buy health insurance and some do 
not is differences in risk aversion.  Households may also differ in their preferences for other 
goods; some households may choose private schools for their children, annual family vacations, 
or nicer homes over having health insurance.  If differences in preferences are responsible for 
variations in insurance coverage, it is not clear that any policy intervention is justified.
1  
Moreover, it can be difficult to distinguish differences in preferences from differences in prices.   
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For example, is living in a city and facing high housing prices as a result a reflection of 
preferences, or an exogenous difference in prices?  Stigler and Becker (1977) have argued that it 
is, in general, impossible to distinguish analytically between these two possibilities; any 
hypothesized difference in preferences can be modeled as a difference in prices.  Therefore we 
should consider carefully any reasonable explanation that relies on income or prices to explain 
variation in insurance coverage, relying on differences in preferences only as the explanation of 
last resort. 
Our goal in this paper is to provide preliminary evidence on the relative importance of 
income, prices, and preferences in explaining the fact that some households are uninsured.  We 
begin by showing that even within quite narrow income categories, the fraction of households 
purchasing insurance is seldom close to either one or zero. We conclude that income cannot be 
the whole story for why some households are uninsured.   
To shed light on whether prices or preferences can explain the remaining variation in 
insurance coverage, we compare the consumption patterns of uninsured households to those of 
insured households with similar total expenditures and other characteristics.  The logic behind 
this exercise is that we can infer from these patterns how prices facing the insured and uninsured 
would have to differ if they were to explain the observed differences in spending between the 
two groups and assess whether the hypothesized price differences seem plausible. Moreover, 
while the prices individual households face are difficult to observe directly, we have very good 
data on household spending patterns. 
Our comparison of spending patterns reveals that uninsured households, on average, 
spend more than comparable insured households on transportation, furniture and appliances, 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 An exception is when we believe there are significant externalities associated with the lack of insurance.  In this 
case, as above, some combination of mandates and subsidies would address the externality without imposing unfair  
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education, and alcohol and tobacco. Since most uninsured households are low income, more 
interesting results emerge when we compare insured versus uninsured households in the bottom 
quartile of the expenditure distribution.
2  Uninsured households in this group devote significantly 
more of their budgets than do the insured to housing, food at home, education, and alcohol and 
tobacco. As we will explain in more detail later, these results are consistent with the idea that the 
uninsured face higher prices for these goods, in particular housing.  Moreoever, controlling for 
homeownership – which is likely to be a proxy for housing prices – cuts the uninsured 
differential in housing spending in half, lending further support to the idea that the uninsured 
may face higher housing prices than the insured. 
Returning to the question we posed at the outset: do income, prices or preferences explain 
the fact that some households do not have health insurance?  Clearly, income matters: health 
insurance is a normal good.  But it is not the only thing that matters.  Our analysis of spending 
patterns suggests that the prices of other goods – most notably housing – may be additional 
important factors causing some households not to purchase health insurance.  In future work, we 
plan to use data on housing prices to quantify more precisely the magnitude of this effect relative 
to the effect of income or preferences, in order to help inform public policy. Our results in this 
paper suggest that policies focusing only on the market for health insurance may be insufficient 




                                                                                                                                                             
costs on low-income households. 
2 We use total expenditures, rather than income, to describe households’ economic status because expenditures are 
likely to be a better measure of permanent income than is annual income (for further discussion of this issue, see 
Rogers and Gray [1994]).  
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2. Background  
  There is a considerable literature on the demographic correlates of health insurance.  A 
recent report by the Institute of Medicine (2001) reviews this literature and also presents new 
analyses confirming what earlier studies have shown: the probability of being uninsured is higher 
for individuals who are poor, less well-educated, nonwhite, and/or in families without a worker.  
In addition to studies that take a demographic approach to analyzing the determinants of 
coverage, a number of recent studies also suggest that private coverage responds at the margin to 
economic incentives.  For example, Cooper and Schone (1997) and Farber and Levy (2000) both 
document that the decline in employer-sponsored coverage during the late 1980s and early 1990s 
was due to declines in enrollment among eligible employees.  Cutler and Gruber (1996) show 
that the Medicaid expansions during the same period caused a decline in private coverage.  Rask 
and Rask (2000) and Herring (2001) both show that private coverage rates respond to the 
availability of charity care in a community.   All of these studies suggest that – as we might 
expect in a voluntary system – having coverage or not is the result of a sequence of rational 
economic decisions. 
  As we have already mentioned, in a simple economic model the amount of a good 
purchased is determined by income, prices (of all goods), and preferences.  Several papers 
address either explicitly or implicitly the importance of income in determining whether or not a 
household has insurance coverage.  In addition to the Institute of Medicine (IOM) report 
discussed above, Thomas (1994/95) estimates the marginal increase in the probability of having 
insurance as income rises; she concludes that the income threshold above which families are 
likely to purchase health insurance is 125% of poverty.  Her estimates show that about half of 
families just below this threshold purchase insurance. Bundorf and Pauly (2000) also estimate  
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the marginal impact of income on the probability of coverage, using more narrowly defined 
income categories than does Thomas. Their results show the probability of coverage increasing 
more or less continuously with family income.  This is prima facie evidence that income is not 
the sole determinant of coverage; if it were, we would expect a sharp discontinuity in the 
probability of having health insurance at some threshold level of income.  Yegian et al. (2000) 
note that about 40 percent of the uninsured are above twice the poverty level and report results 
from a survey of California’s nonpoor uninsured population.  Interestingly, although 60 percent 
of respondents agree with the statement “I worry a lot about not having health insurance for 
others in my family,” only 41 percent agree that “health insurance ranks very high on my list of 
priorities for where to spend my money.” Since these families are all above twice the poverty 
level, the implication again is that being above poverty is insufficient to ensure the purchase of 
health insurance. 
  A number of other studies explore how prices affect health insurance coverage.  Before 
considering the results of these studies, it is worth noting a few important distinctions.  The first 
is between the price of health insurance and the price of other goods.  Without exception, 
existing studies of the relationship between prices and health insurance coverage focus on the 
price of health insurance.  The second distinction, which applies to discussions of the price of 
health insurance, is between prices that are actuarially unfair and prices that are actuarially fair 
but high relative to income.  With one exception which we discuss below, existing studies of 
prices and health insurance discuss prices in the second sense.  That is, they consider whether the 
overall increase in the level of health insurance prices helps explain the overall decline in 
coverage, rather than whether information asymmetries in the insurance market cause some 
consumers to drop out of the market.  The third and final set of distinctions concerns how to  
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measure the overall ‘price’ of health insurance.  Is the correct measure of price the expected 
benefit or the administrative load on that benefit? Is it the employee’s share of the premium or 
the total premium? This issue is discussed at length by Chernew, Cutler and Keenan (2002); we 
do not discuss this issue here except to note that it is a point of debate in this area of the 
literature. 
  Several studies examine the relationship between the price of health insurance and 
coverage. Most of these estimate the own-price elasticity of takeup of coverage offered by an 
employer, rather than the relationship between health insurance prices and the overall rate of 
insurance coverage.  An exception is the study by Chernew, Cutler and Keenan (2002), who find 
only a weak negative relationship between changes in the overall cost of health insurance and 
rates of health insurance coverage at the MSA level.  The estimates of takeup elasticities are 
generally also quite low; Chernew, Frick and McLaughlin (1997) and Gruber and Washington 
(2003) conclude that because of these low elasticities, premium subsidies to workers have only 
limited potential to increase coverage rates. Cutler (2002) also finds a low elasticity of takeup but 
points out that combined with large increases in employee premium contributions, this effect can 
explain the entire decline in take-up of employer-sponsored insurance during the 1990s.   
Only the paper by Cardon and Hendel (2001) addresses the question of whether prices in 
the market for health insurance are actuarially unfair and therefore potentially responsible for the 
fact that some people do not buy insurance. Cardon and Hendel conclude that there is no 
evidence of adverse selection. Evidence on the role of price of health insurance –  in either sense 
–  in determining insurance coverage is therefore mixed.   
There are to our knowledge no studies that have looked at how the price of other goods 
affects the probability of insurance coverage. As a review of why this is relevant, consider how  
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the demand for good Y2 is in theory affected by the price of another good Y1.  The cross-price 





















This cross-price effect has two components.  The first term – the income effect associated with 
the change in the price of Y1 – reduces the consumption of Y2 as long as Y2 is a normal good (by 
definition).  The second term – the compensated substitution effect – may be either positive (the 
goods are net substitutes) or negative (the goods are net complements).  Provided the 
compensated substitution effect is negative or, if positive, is at least smaller in absolute value 
than the income effect, demand for Y2 will decrease in response to an increase in the price of Y1.  
That is, the goods may be gross substitutes even if they are not net substitutes.  Put even more 
simply, an increase in the price of one good may “squeeze out” some spending on another. We 
are interested in exploring whether this phenomenon may help explain why some households do 
not have insurance. 
  To summarize, our reading of the existing literature suggests three things: first, that 
income alone cannot explain the fact that some households have health insurance and some do 
not. Second, that the evidence on the role of the price of health insurance in explaining lack of 
health insurance coverage is mixed.  Third, although there has been no work attempting to 
determine how the prices of other goods affect health insurance coverage, simple economic 
theory predicts that they should matter. One of our goals in looking at the consumption patterns 
of insured and uninsured households is to try to understand whether higher prices of other goods 





Our main analysis relies on a comparison of the spending patterns of uninsured 
households with insured households that are comparable in terms of demographics and total 
spending.  Specifically, we estimate multivariate regressions controlling for household 
composition and demographics. For each of the sixteen expenditure categories, we estimate a 
separate linear regression with the household’s spending in that category as the dependent 
variable:  
() j j j y y STATE pending s total uninsured X Y ε δ γ β + + + + + ⋅ + ⋅ + = 1998 1994 ... ) ( ) (   (1)
where j indexes the 16 expenditure categories, X is a vector of demographic controls, 
uninsured is a dummy variable equal to one if the household has no health insurance, STATE is a 
vector of state dummy variables, and y1994…y1998 is a set of year dummies. The demographic 
controls we use are race (white, non-white) of the head, educational attainment of the head 
(indicator variables for being a high school dropout, being a high school graduate, having some 
college, or being a college graduate), age of the head, the number of male adults in the family, 
the number of female adults in the family, the number of boys (ages 2 to 17) in the family, the 
number of girls (ages 2 to 17) in the family, and the number of infants.  The coefficient γ  on the 
uninsured dummy measures the average difference in spending on good j for an uninsured 
compared to an insured household.  To focus on households that must choose between paying for 
private insurance and being uninsured, we drop households where anyone has public insurance 
from the sample.  We also drop households in which some members have private insurance and 
some are uninsured.  We describe exactly how the sample is drawn in section four.  
These regressions allow us to identify which goods take up more of an uninsured 
household’s budget than an insured household’s.  In order to see how this may help shed light on  
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whether prices or preferences explain why one household has health insurance and another with 
the same total budget does not, we review the relationship between prices and spending. 
Consider a consumer with income m who allocates this income to n goods X1,…,Xn and faces a 
vector of prices p1,…pn.  Expenditures on good j are given by j jp X . If the price of good 1 
increases, the expenditure on good 1 may increase or decrease depending on the own-price 




















So if X1 is inelastically demanded (that is,  1
1 1, < p x η ), the amount spent on X1 increases 
with the price of X1.  Suppose we observe uninsured households spending more than insured 
households on good X1 (holding total spending and other household characteristics constant). If 
we are to conclude that this spending differential occurs because the insured and the uninsured 
face different prices, it must be that X1 is inelastically demanded with respect to its own price and 




The data we analyze are from the 1994 through 1998 panels of the Consumer Expenditure 
Survey (CEX).  The CEX, which is collected by the Census Bureau under contract from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, is a nationally representative survey of about 7,000 households per 
year.  It contains information on the demographic characteristics of each household member and 
                                                 
3 Alternatively, this could happen if demand for X1 were elastic and the uninsured faced lower prices than the 
insured. We do not focus on this possibility since the uninsured facing lower prices than the insured for other goods 
ought to increase their health insurance spending (unless there are very strong patterns of net substitution between 
health insurance and other goods). 
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detailed household-level information on income, expenditures and health insurance.  In the CEX, 
a “consumer unit” or family is the basic unit of observation.  A consumer unit is smaller than a 
“household” and is meant to include only those household members who depend upon one 
another and who share expenditures.  For details of the distinction between a consumer unit and 
a household in the CEX, please see BLS (2002).
4  In this paper, we use the terms family and 
household interchangeably. Each household is interviewed up to four times at three-month 
intervals.  Three months of expenditure data are collected retrospectively at each quarterly 
interview for a total of twelve months of expenditure data.   
 
Preliminary sample restrictions 
We begin with 39,617 households interviewed in the 1994 through 1998 panels of the CEX. 
For each household, we have between one and four observations on quarterly expenditures in 
each of these categories. We average quarterly expenditures over however many observations are 
available so that there is one observation per household for each expenditure category.  Medical 
care and housing expenditures in a given quarter may be negative (because of reimbursements or 
refunds).  We drop from the sample 345 households that have negative average quarterly 
expenditures in one or both of these categories, 471 households with missing income data and 47 
households without adults, resulting in a sample of 38,754 households.  
 
                                                 
4 According to the BLS, a consumer unit consists of any of the following: (1) All members of a particular household 
who are related by blood, marriage, adoption, or other legal arrangements; (2) a person living alone or sharing a 
household with others or living as a roomer in a private home or lodging house or in permanent living quarters in a 
hotel or motel, but who is financially independent; or (3) two or more persons living together who use their incomes 
to make joint expenditure decisions. Financial independence is determined by the three major expense categories: 
Housing, food, and other living expenses. To be considered financially independent, at least two of the three major 
expenditure categories have to be provided entirely or in part by the respondent.  In regard to the CEX, the BLS uses 
the terms consumer unit, family, and household interchangeably for convenience. However, the proper technical 
term in the CEX is consumer unit (BLS 2002).  
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Defining the uninsured 
Each household in the CEX reports the total number of health insurance policies held by 
anyone in the household in each quarter, and the number of household members covered by each 
policy. It is not possible to identify which individuals in a household are covered (either as 
dependents or as the policyholder) by a particular private policy. Each household also reports 
which individuals were covered by Medicare and/or Medicaid. We categorize households as 
uninsured, partially insured, fully insured, covered by Medicaid or covered by Medicare 
according to the insurance status of all members of the household at the first quarter in which the 
household is observed, as follows: 
•  Households that do not report holding any private insurance policies and have zero 
expenditure on health insurance are considered to be uninsured. 
•  Households that report holding a private insurance policy or policies that cover some 
but not all household members and report zero expenditure on health insurance are 
considered partially insured. 
•  Households that report holding one or more private insurance policies that cover at 
least as many people as there are in the household or who report any positive 
expenditures on health insurance are considered fully insured. 
•  Households with at least one member covered by Medicaid and no one covered by 
Medicare are considered covered by Medicaid (even if some or all members of the 
household also have private insurance). 
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•  Households with anyone covered by Medicare, or in which the reference person is 
age 65 or older, are considered covered by Medicare (even if some or all members of 
the household also have private insurance). 
Households may change insurance status across waves. We discard the 2,623 households that 
do so, leaving us with a sample of 36,131 households; our results are very similar if instead we 
categorize household on the basis of their insurance status at the first interview.   
 
Expenditure categories 
The CEX gathers data on expenditures in hundreds of detailed categories. We aggregate 
these detailed expenditures into 16 broad expenditure categories: (1) food to be consumed in the 
home, (2) food to be consumed outside of the home (at restaurants etc.), (3) alcohol and tobacco, 
(4) housing expenses (rent and renting-related expenses, mortgage and mortgage related 
expenses, and home improvements), (5) non-mortgage interest, (6) furniture, appliances and 
related expenses, (7) home maintenance, (8) clothing (adult clothing and shoes, children’s 
clothing and shoes, and clothing services), (9) transportation (car purchases, car leases, other 
private transportation expenses, fuel, car repairs, car insurance, public transportation expenses), 
(10) utilities, (11) medical care, (12) health insurance, (13) entertainment expenses, (14) personal 
care, (15)  education, and (16) other.  Note that each of these categories includes expenditures 
made by the household members only – in particular, expenses made on behalf of households 
members by insurance companies or employers are not reflected in these data. This means that 
medical care and health insurance reflect out-of-pocket payments only. 
  The CEX measures expenditures and not consumption. Expenditures may be a noisy 
measure of consumption – for example, where a family occupies public housing.  In addition,  
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there is topcoding for some expenditure items.  In order to minimize measurement error 
associated with these factors, we trim the top and bottom 5 percent of spenders in our sample.  
This does not appreciably change the substance of our results and leaves a sample of 32,519 
households. Of these, about one-third are either partially insured or publicly insured: 2 percent 
partially insured, 7 percent Medicaid, 25 percent Medicare. We drop these households from the 
analysis.
5  Our analysis focuses on the remaining 4,682 uninsured households and 16,842 fully 
privately insured households, to whom we refer from now on as “the uninsured” and “the 
insured,” respectively. 
 
Measurement error in health insurance and medical care spending 
Since the CEX collects data on out-of-pocket spending only, both health insurance and 
medical care spending are certain to be mismeasured for the insured because of employer-paid 
health insurance premiums and direct payments from insurers to medical providers.  This has 
two implications for our analysis.  First, the observed spending differentials in these two 
categories between the insured and the uninsured will understate the true difference in spending.  
As long as we are primarily interested in other categories of spending (e.g., food and housing), 
this just means that we should keep in mind that the estimated differentials for health insurance 
and medical care are likely to be understated.  Second, and more seriously, our measure of total 
spending will be systematically underestimated for the insured but not for the uninsured.  This 
has the potential to bias our estimates of the insured/uninsured differential on other categories of 
spending, like food and housing.  This is because we are effectively comparing a richer insured 
                                                 
5 The regression results do not change much if the partially insured are included with the fully insured.  They are 
also robust to categorizing households on the basis of reported policies only (i.e. households with a policy that 
covers only some household members and positive health insurance spending are counted as partially insured).  
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household with a poorer uninsured household, even though both have the same observed total 
spending.   
To bound the magnitude of this bias, we calculate an alternative set of estimates as follows. 
Since workers directly pay, on average, only about 20 percent of health insurance premiums with 
firms paying the remainder on their behalf (Krueger and Levy 1996), we assume that total health 
insurance spending would actually be five times what we observe for each household in the 
CEX. We re-estimate all the regressions using this alternative measure of health insurance 
spending and the higher level of total spending it implies.  This adjustment does not substantially 
affect any of the results of the analysis presented below, so we conclude that the understatement 




We begin our empirical analysis by stratifying the sample by total spending and 
calculating the fraction with private health insurance at each spending level.  These results are 
presented in table 1.
6  Consistent with the results of earlier work discussed above, we find that 
the fraction with health insurance increases fairly smoothly with income.  Moreover, even at the 
ends of the distribution, the fraction with insurance is not close to zero or one.  Among the 
poorest two percent of households in our sample, 30 percent have private health insurance, and 
seven percent of households in the top fifth of the expenditure distribution are uninsured.  The 
point here is that there does not appear to be a level of income that functions as a cutoff above 
                                                 
6 All of the statistics and analyses we present have been weighted using the sampling weights provided with the 
CEX so as to be nationally representative. 
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which everyone has private insurance and below which no one does, so income alone cannot 
explain why some households are uninsured. 
  Table 2 presents statistics on demographic and household composition by insurance 
status. Comparing mean values of the household demographic characteristics for the different 
groups reveals that uninsured households have lower total expenditures than fully insured 
households: uninsured households have mean quarterly expenditures of only $5,077, compared 
with $8,050 for fully insured households.  Household heads in uninsured households have lower 
educational attainment than the heads of insured households; 22 percent of uninsured household 
heads are high school dropouts, compared with only 8 percent in fully insured households.  They 
are also more likely to be nonwhite (19.8 percent for uninsured versus 13.0 percent for fully 
insured).   
  Differences in employment and homeownership are more pronounced.  Uninsured 
households are more than twice as likely as fully insured households to have no earner (8.4 
percent versus 3.0 percent). Note, however, that this still means that the vast majority of the 
uninsured are in households with at least one worker. Conditional on having an earner, heads in 
uninsured households are less likely to work in the public sector (8.8 percent versus 13.7 
percent) and more likely to be self-employed (8.6 percent versus 4.2 percent) than are heads in 
fully insured households.  The most striking difference, however, may be that the uninsured are 
nearly twice as likely to be renters: 61.8 percent of the uninsured rent their homes, compared 
with only 33.4 percent of the fully insured. To the extent that these household characteristics 
drive spending patterns, it will be important to control for them in our analysis in order to 
understand the differences between the spending of the insured and the uninsured.  
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Table 3 shows mean budget shares and mean real expenditures (in 1998 dollars) for all 
households by insurance status.  The three largest expenditure categories for both insured and 
uninsured households are housing, food at home, and transportation. Insured households spend 
just over three percent of their budgets, or $236 per quarter, on health insurance (recall that this 
amount does not reflect payments made directly by an employer to an insurance company on the 
household’s behalf).  
Comparing budget shares across insurance status reveals that the uninsured spend a larger 
share of their budgets on food at home (16.9 percent) than the fully insured (12.8 percent).  The 
uninsured also spend a larger share on housing: 26.6 percent versus 25.4 percent for the fully 
insured.  The uninsured spend a substantially smaller share of their budgets on transportation 
(15.7 percent versus 17.2 percent for the fully insured).  Out-of-pocket medical care expenses 
account for a slightly larger share of budgets for the insured (3.8 percent versus 1.9 percent for 
the uninsured).
7 
As we have already noted, insured and uninsured households do not differ only in their 
health insurance status. As a first cut at comparing uninsured households with similar insured 
households, we calculate mean expenditure shares separately for insured and uninsured 
households in the lowest quartile (“low spenders”), the middle 50 percent (“middle spenders”), 
and the top quartile of total expenditures (“high spenders”).  The results are presented in table 4.  
Among low spenders, the uninsured spend a larger fraction of their budgets on housing than do 
the insured (28.2 percent compared with 26.1 percent), on food at home (19.5 percent compared 
with 16.5 percent), and on education (3.5 percent compared with 2.4 percent). Low-spending 
uninsured households also spend a larger share of their budgets on alcohol and tobacco (4.4 
                                                 
7 Paulin and Weber (1995) report similar differences in spending patterns between insured and uninsured and 
uninsured households in the 1993 Consumer Expenditure Survey.  
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percent compared to 3.3 percent) than do insured households.  On average, the low-spending 
uninsured spend $126 per quarter on alcohol and tobacco, which is more than the $119 that their 
insured counterparts spend out-of-pocket on health insurance.  This is not to suggest that 
uninsured households could actually purchase health insurance with the amount they currently 
spend on alcohol and tobacco – as we have already noted, most health insurance premiums are 
paid by employers, so that the actual price of health insurance per quarter is more likely to be 
about $595 per quarter for these households. 
At the same time, low-spending uninsured households spend a smaller share of their 
budgets on categories other than health insurance.  The low-spending uninsured spend 
significantly less on interest, home maintenance, transportation, utilities, health care and personal 
care than do insured households with similar total expenditures.   
The differences between spending patterns of the insured versus the uninsured are much 
smaller for high spenders.  In particular, the only categories on which uninsured high-spenders 
spend a significantly larger share of their budgets than do insured high-spenders are alcohol and 
tobacco (0.017 versus 0.014), transportation (0.320 versus 0.239), furniture and appliances 
(0.063 versus 0.054) and education (0.035 versus 0.030).  This is a striking contrast to the result 
reported above for low-spending households; the differences between insured and uninsured 
households’ consumption patterns are very different for poorer versus well-off households.  
 
Regression Results  
  Of course, the insured and the uninsured differ in many ways other than total spending; 
for example, as shown in table 2, the uninsured have lower educational attainment and are more 
likely to be non-white. In order to control for total spending as well as these observable  
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differences, we run multivariate regressions to estimate adjusted differences in spending using 
the methods described above.  Table 5 presents the coefficients on the “uninsured” dummy 
variable from separate regressions (for each of the sixteen expenditure categories) corresponding 
to equation (1) for all households.
8  The coefficient on this “uninsured” dummy variable 
measures the average difference in spending between insured and uninsured households for that 
expenditure category.     
  It is not obvious whether controls for employment, urban location and homeownership 
ought to be included in these regressions, since all three of these characteristics could be 
considered household consumption choices. One person might choose to own a home in Ithaca, 
NY, for example, while another person with the same total budget might choose to rent an 
apartment in Manhattan.
9  Since it is not clear whether including these controls is appropriate, we 
present results corresponding to three different specifications.  The first specification includes 
only basic controls—age, sex, race and education of the household head, and the number of adult 
males, adult females, girls, boys and infants in the household and year and state dummies.  The 
second specification adds to these basic controls dummy variables reflecting whether a 
household has zero, one, or two or more earners; the sector of employment of the primary earner 
(private, public, self-employed, or unknown/no primary earner); and a set of dummies reflecting 
whether the household lives in a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and whether the household 
lives in an urban area.  The third specification includes, in addition to the basic, employment, and 
urbanicity controls, controls for homeownership.  The homeownership controls consist of 
dummies for whether the household owns a home without a mortgage, owns a home with a 
                                                 
8 The complete set of results (that is, the coefficients on the independent variables in addition to the “uninsured” 
dummy) corresponding to the basic regression in column one of table 5 is reported in Table A1 of the appendix.  
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mortgage, rents, occupies a home rent-free, or lives in dormitory.  Columns (1), (2), and (3) of 
table five report the linear regression results for the specifications including basic, employment 
and urbanicity, and homeownership controls respectively.   
Since the results in table 4 suggested that the difference between insured and uninsured 
households may look different depending on how well-off the households are, we also stratify 
the sample by total spending and estimate complete sets of regressions on each subsample.   
Tables 6, 7 and 8 present results of these regressions for households in the lowest quartile (“low 
spenders”), middle fifty percent (“middle spenders”), and top quartile (“high spenders”) of the 
total spending distribution respectively.   
Since more than half of the uninsured households in our sample (2,403 out of 4,682) are 
low spenders, we begin by focusing on our results for this group, presented in table six. These 
results confirm that for the low-spending households, the mean differences between uninsured 
and insured households that were reported in table four persist when we control for a basic set of 
household characteristics.  In particular, according to the linear regression results, the uninsured 
spend significantly more than do insured households on housing ($88), on food at home ($40), 
on education ($35) and on alcohol and tobacco ($20).  These results confirm that low-spending 
uninsured households spend more on basic needs, plus alcohol and tobacco. The uninsured also 
spend significantly less than the insured on several items besides health insurance: interest ($24 
less), utilities ($22 less), home maintenance ($10 less), and personal care ($4 less).  Figure two 
summarizes these differentials graphically. 
What do these spending differentials suggest about whether the low-spending uninsured 
may face higher prices than the insured for goods other than health insurance?  Consider the 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 One might argue that education and family composition are consumption choices as well.  In practice, controlling 
for these variables (the basic regression specification) yields the same qualitative result as the simple differences in  
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largest differential, the $88 more per quarter the uninsured spend on housing.  Since housing is 
inelastically demanded with respect to its own price (Hanushek and Quigley [1980]), the higher 
housing expenditures of the uninsured are consistent with their facing higher prices for housing.  
Alternative explanations for this differential include that the uninsured consume more or better 
housing. We present evidence below that the uninsured do not consume more housing.  Further 
support for the idea that the uninsured may, in fact, face higher housing prices comes when we 
add controls for housing tenure to the regression. The addition of employment and urbanicity 
controls does not change the regression-adjusted estimates of the differences in spending 
between insured and uninsured households; adding the homeownership controls, in contrast, 
eliminates more than half of the difference in housing and home maintenance expenditures and 
all of the difference in expenditures on utilities between insured and uninsured households. Thus, 
the results for the low-spending uninsured (representing more than half the total uninsured in our 
sample) raise the interesting possibility that high housing prices may partially explain the fact 
that these households do not have health insurance. 
  The differential between insured and uninsured middle-spending households look 
somewhat different from those just discussed for the low-spending households.  Among middle 
spenders, uninsured households spend significantly more than insured households on 
transportation ($172), education ($101), food at home ($31), and alcohol and tobacco ($25).  
Adding controls for employment, urbanicity and housing tenure reduces some of these 
differentials a bit (in particular, the education differential drops to $68 and the alcohol/tobacco 
differentials drops to $14), but all remain significant. What is most interesting about these results 
is that in contrast to the low-spending uninsured, who spent more than their insured counterparts 
on a good that is demanded inelastically, the middle-spending uninsured spend more on goods 
                                                                                                                                                             
mean budget shares in Table 5.  
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that are likely to be demanded elastically: education and transportation.  This means that higher 
prices of goods other than health insurance are not a plausible explanation for lack of insurance 
coverage in this group.  
  The regression results for high spenders illustrate this point even more clearly. The only 
two categories on which high-spending uninsured spend more than their comparable insured 
households are transportation ($673) and furniture/appliances ($102).  As long as these goods are 
demanded elastically with respect to price, higher spending suggests that if the uninsured face 
different prices from the insured these prices must be lower and therefore cannot explain why the 
uninsured do not have health insurance. In common sense terms, it simply does not sound 
plausible to suggest that the well-off uninsured do not buy health insurance because of the high 
cost of transportation and furniture. 
  Thus, analysis of spending patterns of the well-off uninsured does not offer plausible 
candidates for goods other than health insurance that might help explain why these households 
do not buy health insurance.  Two possibilities remain.  One is that the well-off uninsured face 
higher prices of health insurance than the well-off insured. We have no way to test this 
possibility with these data.  Alternatively, we might conclude that the well-off uninsured simply 
have different preferences than the well-off insured. If this latter explanation is correct, as we 
have already noted, it is not obvious what role there is for policy intervention.  
 
Detailed Analyses of the Housing Expenses of Low-Spending households  
  The CEX data allow us to analyze the differences in housing spending for low-spending 
insured and uninsured households in more detail.  We have already demonstrated that the 
inclusion of controls for housing tenure “explains” about half of the spending differential in the  
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sense that it drops from $88 to $38 in magnitude. We can also use more disaggregated data to see 
exactly which components of housing expenditure are higher for the uninsured and to see 
whether the uninsured consume more housing than the insured.  Table 9 presents descriptive 
statistics on components of housing expenditure and housing characteristics for low-spending 
insured and uninsured households.  The first two row of table 9 shows that uninsured households 
spend a larger share of their budgets and a larger real dollar expenditure on housing than do 
insured households—this is the same information reported in table 4.  An examination of the 
components of housing expenditure shows that this difference in total expenditure is being 
driven primarily by differences in rent, which is the largest single component of housing 
expenditure.  Table 9 also shows that on average, the uninsured do not consume a larger quantity 
of housing when quantity is defined as number of rooms: the uninsured living in housing units 
with 4.3 rooms on average compared with 4.7 for the insured. 
  To control for differences in homeownership status (though not other observable 
differences between the insured and the uninsured), table 10 presents the same statistics on 
detailed housing expenditures by insurance status separately for homeowners without a 
mortgage, homeowners with a mortgage, and renters.  Among homeowners with no mortgage, 
there are no differences between the housing expenditures of insured and uninsured.  Similarly, 
among renters, uninsured households do not have higher expenditures.  In fact, uninsured renters 
spend $104 less per quarter than do insured renters.  There are differences in expenditure 
between insured and uninsured households among homeowners with a mortgage.  Thus, the 
overall differences in housing expenditure between insured and uninsured households are 
primarily due to differences in homeownership status, plus slightly higher expenditure among 
uninsured homeowners with mortgages.  
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  Table 11 reports the coefficient on the “uninsured” dummy variable from a set of linear 
regressions with the components of housing expenditure as the dependent variables.  As in tables 
5 through 8, the three columns correspond to specifications with basic controls (first column), 
plus controls for employment and urbanicity (second column) and plus controls for 
homeownership (third column).  As we expect given the findings reported in table 10, the 
addition of homeownership controls eliminates almost all of the differences between insured and 
uninsured households not only for total housing expenditure but also for each of the components 
of housing expenditure. 
    
Detailed Analysis of the Transportation Expenses of High-Spending Households  
The fact that high-spending uninsured households spend a larger share of their budgets on 
transportation than do high-spending insured households raises two questions: first, what 
particular transportation expense is driving these differences?  Second, is this result driven by the 
fact that some households are incorrectly classified as “high spenders” by a one-time purchase of 
a durable good like a car? To address the first question, table 12 reports the breakdown of 
average transportation expenditures for insured and uninsured households into detailed 
components.  It appears that the differences between the insured and uninsured are primarily in 
spending on used cars. Table 12 also shows that the uninsured do not have a larger stock of 
vehicles than the insured; the uninsured have on average 2.2 vehicles compared with 2.7 for the 
insured.  Table 13 reports regression-adjusted estimates of these differentials that support the 
same conclusion: the difference between transportation spending of insured and uninsured 
households is due to used cars.  The inclusion of additional controls for employment, urbanicity 
and housing tenure has almost no effect on the estimated difference.    
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Table 13 also presents regression results that use household income rather than total 
expenditures as a control in the regressions to address the possibility that houses are being 
misclassified as high spenders by a transitory spike in spending due to the purchase of a car.  The 
last three columns of table 13 contain these results.  It appears that the use of expenditures rather 
than income does explain some (not quite half) of the difference in spending between the insured 
and uninsured. Using income as a control, the regression-adjusted estimate of the differential is 
between $289 (including all controls) and $430 (basic controls only), compared with $457 (all 
controls) to $673 (basic controls) when including total expenditures instead of income.  The 
differentials remain significant, however. 
 
6. Discussion 
We have documented that there are differences in the spending patterns of insured and 
uninsured households, and also that the spending differentials are quite different for low-
spending versus high spending households.  For low-spending households, expenditures of the 
uninsured relative to the uninsured are tilted primarily toward housing and food; for high 
spenders, the differential is transportation and furniture/appliances.  At what level of spending 
does this crossover occur?  To answer this question, we aggregate expenditures into two 
categories: basic needs and non-basic needs.  We consider food at home, housing, and utilities to 
be basic needs; all other expenditures are non-basic.  The first row of table 14 reports the fraction 
of our sample that is insured, and share of total spending allocated to basic needs for both the 
insured and uninsured.  The uninsured spend, on average, 54 percent of their budget on basic 
needs compared with 48 percent for the insured.  Of course, the main reason for this is that 
uninsured households are poorer than insured households, on average, and basic needs are  
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necessities.  This can be seen in the first two columns of Table 14 which report the cumulative 
fractions of the entire sample and the uninsured sample by expenditure level: the median 
household has quarterly total expenditures between $6,500 and $7,000 while the median 
uninsured household has quarterly total expenditures between $4,000 and $4,500. 
The fourth and fifth columns of Table 14 report the share of households’ budgets that are 
spent on basic needs at a variety of total expenditure levels.  For example, uninsured households 
with quarterly total expenditures of less than $2,000 spend 60.4 percent of their budgets on basic 
needs compared with 50.4 percent for comparable insured households.  At what level of 
quarterly total expenditure do uninsured households begin to spend less on basic needs than 
comparable insured households?  At a quarterly total expenditure of about $6,500, both 
uninsured and insured households spend about 50 percent of their budgets on basic needs.  At all 
levels of total expenditure below $6,500 per quarter, uninsured households spend more on basic 
needs than do insured households.  Moreover, 76.8 percent of uninsured households have 
quarterly total expenditure levels of $6,500 or less.  Therefore, one could consider about three-
quarters of the uninsured as falling below a spending level where insurance is in a very loose 
sense being “replaced” by spending on basic needs.   
A regression-based approach to the same question is the following.  We estimate the 
share of spending devoted to basic needs as a function of total expenditures, a dummy for 
uninsurance and total expenditures interacted with a dummy for uninsurance, controlling for 
demographics and household composition.  This regression captures the relationship between 
spending on basic needs and total expenditures for insured and uninsured households; figure 5 
depicts this relationship graphically.  The idea is that at low levels of total expenditure, uninsured 
households spend more on basic needs than do insured households, while at higher levels of total  
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expenditure, uninsured households do not spend more on basic needs than do insured 
households.  We want to know at what implied level of total spending an uninsured household 
spends less on basic needs than do insured households.  In figure 5, this level of total expenditure 
is given by Y*, where the two lines intersect.   
  The results of this regression are presented in table 15.  The coefficient on the uninsured 
dummy is 0.08365; the coefficient on total expenditures is –0.000019 and the coefficient on the 
interaction of uninsured with total expenditures is –0.000011.  This means that at low levels of 
expenditure, the uninsured spend a higher fraction of their budgets on basic needs, but that this 
differential gets smaller as total expenditure increases.  At a total expenditure of $7,594 per 
quarter, the uninsured begin spending a smaller share of their budgets on basic needs than do the 
insured at the same level of total expenditure. That is, the value of Y* in figure 5 implied by this 
regression is $7,594.  Eighty-four percent of uninsured households fall below this threshold. Of 
course, 53 percent of households with insurance also fall below this threshold.   
  Our definition of “basic needs” is arbitrary.  An alternative way to do this is to use the 
economic definition of necessities versus luxuries.  We estimate total expenditure elasticities for 
each category of consumption and determine that the following expenditures are empirically 
necessities (i.e. they have total expenditure elasticity of less than or equal to one; results are in 
appendix Table A2): food at home, utilities, health insurance, alcohol and tobacco, personal care, 
housing, interest, food away from home, and clothing.  Using this definition to aggregate 
expenditures into necessities (except for health insurance) and luxuries, we find very similar 
results to those using the “basic needs” dependent variable.  These results also are reported in 
table 15. We estimate that at total expenditures of $7,032, uninsured households begin spending  
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less on necessities than do insured households.  Eighty percent of uninsured households and 47 
percent of insured households fall below this threshold.   
 
7. Conclusion 
  Our main results and their implications for future research on the uninsured can be 
summarized as follows.  First, we find that income cannot be the whole story for why some 
households do not have health insurance: the probability of coverage increases more or less 
continuously with income.  This result has appeared in the literature but it is worth emphasizing 
that this means low income cannot be the only explanation for lack of coverage.  Second, we find 
that low-income uninsured households – comprising most of the uninsured –  spend more than 
comparable insured households on some necessities and, in particular, on housing. This raises the 
intriguing possibility, which we plan to explore in future work, that high housing prices may help 
explain why some households do not have health insurance. Third, high-income uninsured 
households have higher spending only on transportation and furniture/appliances. This suggests 
it is highly unlikely that price differentials for goods other than health insurance (such as 
housing, food, utilities, or transportation) explain why they are uninsured.  Instead, either 
preferences or high prices of health insurance must explain the lack of insurance coverage for a 
small but nontrivial fraction of well-off households. 
  What are the implications for policy?  Firm recommendations for policy await more 
conclusive results on the role of health insurance prices versus housing prices in explaining lack 
of insurance coverage among the low-spending insured.  But we believe that our preliminary 
results should add two new dimensions to policy discussions about the uninsured. First, 
heterogeneity within the population without health insurance highlights the dangers of treating  
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“the uninsured” as a single group. Our results for low-spending uninsured households are quite 
different from those for high-spending uninsured households.  High-spending uninsured 
households are a minority of the uninsured (about ten percent) but represent a nontrivial number 
of households: about four million.  It may make more sense in thinking about public policy to 
focus on the needs of the poor uninsured than simply the uninsured.  Second, when we think 
about why households are uninsured, the discussion should be extended beyond income and the 
price of health insurance to include a role for the prices of other goods.  Our results strongly 
suggest a role for housing prices in explaining why some uninsured households lack coverage. 
Modeling health insurance coverage as economic choice that requires weighing all possible uses 
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Table 1 










Total 1.000 0.779 
  
$2,000 0.020 0.303 
$2,500 0.039 0.437 
$3,000 0.046 0.485 
$3,500 0.057 0.568 
$4,000 0.058 0.645 
$4,500 0.059 0.675 
$5,000 0.055 0.737 
$5,500 0.056 0.795 
$6,000 0.055 0.793 
$6,500 0.049 0.820 
$7,000 0.048 0.847 
$7,500 0.046 0.840 
$8,000 0.041 0.887 
$8,500 0.038 0.877 
$9,000 0.034 0.909 
$9,500 0.033 0.888 
$10,000 0.029 0.915 
$10,500 0.024 0.898 
$10,500+ 0.213 0.926 
 
Total sample size is 21,524 households. 
  33
Table 2 




Insured  Uninsured 
Basic control variables   
Age of Reference Person  40.4 34.9 
Family size  2.6 2.3 
Number of Adult Males  0.944 0.884 
Number of Adult Females  0.969 0.807 
Number of Boys  0.303 0.256 
Number of Girls  0.298 0.265 
Number of Babies  0.073 0.068 
Non-white  0.13 0.198 
H.S. Dropout  0.082 0.215 
H.S. Graduate  0.29 0.313 
Some College  0.301 0.329 
College Graduate  0.206 0.101 
Graduate degree  0.12 0.043 
Female Reference Person  0.343 0.387 
Total real expenditures  $8,050   $5,077  
 
Employment and urbanicity variables 
No earner  0.030 0.084 
One earner  0.416 0.602 
Two earners or more  0.554 0.314 
Primary earner is private sector  0.814 0.801 
Primary earner is public sector  0.137 0.088 
Primary earner is self-employed  0.042 0.086 
DK sector of primary earner   0.007 0.024 
Non-MSA, rural  0.058 0.056 
Non-MSA, urban   0.031 0.039 
Non-MSA, DK urbanicity  0.118 0.160 
MSA, urban   0.331 0.343 
MSA, DK urbanicity  0.463 0.401 
 
Housing variables     
Own home, no mortgage  0.486 0.185 
Own home, with mortgage  0.153 0.108 
Rent  0.334 0.618 
Occupy home rent-free  0.016 0.047 
Live in dormitory  0.01 0.041 
       




Expenditures by insurance status 
 





p-value on  
t-test that 
means differ: 
Share spent on:  Mean SD Mean SD  
 Housing  0.254  0.135  0.266  0.155  -0.012  <0.0001 
 Food  In  0.128  0.069  0.169  0.106  -0.041  <0.0001 
  Food Out  0.050  0.044  0.052  0.061  -0.003       0.0172 
 Transportation  0.172  0.143  0.157  0.153  0.015  <0.0001 
 Utilities  0.095  0.051  0.104  0.074  -0.009  <0.0001 
 Furniture/Appliances  0.047  0.061  0.043  0.070  0.004  <0.0001 
 Clothing  0.040  0.036  0.038  0.047  0.002  0.0229 
 Entertainment  0.038  0.041  0.031  0.046  0.008  <0.0001 
 Health  Insurance  0.032  0.039  0.000  0.000  0.032  <0.0001 
 Health  Care  0.024  0.038  0.019  0.048  0.005  <0.0001 
 Education  0.024  0.065  0.036  0.105  -0.012  <0.0001 
  Alcohol and Tobacco  0.023  0.033  0.037  0.053  -0.014  <0.0001 
 Home  Maintenance  0.021  0.044  0.011  0.036  0.010  <0.0001 
 Interest  0.016  0.026  0.010  0.025  0.005  <0.0001 
 Personal  Care  0.011  0.011  0.010  0.015  0.001  0.0085 
 Other  0.026  0.049  0.016  0.046  0.009  <0.0001 
          
Real Expenditures on:         
 Total  8,052  3,930  5,077  3,083  2,976  <0.0001 
 Housing  2,009  1,498  1,274  1,024  736  <0.0001 
 Food  In  931  533  755  511  176  <0.0001 
 Food  Out  388  388  251  311  137  <0.0001 
 Transportation  1,574  1,991  985  1,661  589  <0.0001 
 Utilities  684  341  480  351  204  <0.0001 
 Furniture/Appliances  406  590  244  509  162  <0.0001 
 Clothing  322  324  194  271  128  <0.0001 
 Entertainment  326  440  165  318  161  <0.0001 
 Health  Insurance  236  283  0  0  236  <0.0001 
 Health  Care  199  349  113  385  86  <0.0001 
 Education  205  596  185  637  21  0.0145 
  Alcohol and Tobacco  157  212  156  222  1  0.8771 
 Home  Maintenance  188  429  72  263  116  <0.0001 
 Interest  119  193  57  138  63  <0.0001 
 Personal  Care  79  78  47  71  32  <0.0001 
 Other  227  507  99  347  128  <0.0001 
          




Expenditures by insurance status and total spending 
 
  Low spenders    Middle spenders    High spenders 
  Insured Uninsured    Insured Uninsured   Insured  Uninsured 
Share spent on:      
  Housing  0.261 0.282    0.257 0.258    0.242 0.198 
  Food  In  0.165 0.195    0.134 0.151    0.095 0.092 
  Food  Out  0.055 0.056    0.050 0.049    0.046 0.042 
  Transportation  0.127 0.118    0.151 0.175    0.240 0.321 
  Utilities  0.124 0.113    0.100 0.100    0.068 0.062 
  Furn.  and  Appliances  0.033 0.035    0.049 0.049    0.054 0.063 
  Clothing  0.037 0.038    0.042 0.038    0.039 0.038 
  Entertainment  0.030 0.028    0.038 0.032    0.044 0.038 
  Health  Insurance  0.036 0.000    0.035 0.000    0.024 0.000 
  Health  Care  0.020 0.015    0.025 0.024    0.025 0.026 
  Education  0.024 0.035    0.020 0.037    0.030 0.035 
  Alcohol  and  Tobacco  0.033 0.044    0.024 0.030    0.014 0.017 
  Home  Maintenance 0.012 0.007    0.021 0.015    0.027 0.025 
  Interest  0.017 0.008    0.017 0.013    0.013 0.011 
  Personal  Care  0.012 0.011    0.011 0.009    0.009 0.007 
  Other  0.017 0.012    0.026 0.020    0.031 0.024 
 
Real Expenditures on:              
  Total  $3,302 $2,984    $6,896 $6,264    $13,208  $12,841 
  Housing  867  844   1,771  1,594   3,176  2,521 
  Food  In  537 573    906 916    1,227  1,161 
  Food  Out  178 168    343 303    602 529 
  Transportation  423  359   1,063  1,134   3,251  4,245 
  Utilities  407 337    672 612    883 779 
  Furn. and Appliances  109  107    343  312    713  800 
  Clothing  123 114    290 242    507 477 
  Entertainment  99  83   269  208   576  485 
  Health  Insurance 119 0    238 0    307 0 
  Health  Care  68  47   177  153   323  343 
  Education  73 108    143 238    405 425 
  Alcohol and Tobacco  107  126    158  184    188  221 
  Home  Maintenance 40 21    149 92    354  310 
  Interest  56 26    115 82    168  137 
  Personal  Care  40 32    75 58    112 93 
  Other  56  38   184  135   414  316 
              
Sample  size  2,978 2,403    8,894 1,868    4,970  411 




Differences in spending: uninsured versus insured, all households 
 







Quarterly spending  on:  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Housing -$38  -$43  3 
  (19) (20) (19) 
     
Food In  16  10  9 
  (7) (8) (8) 
     
Food Out  -6  -11  -17 
  (6) (6) (6) 
     
Transportation  231 249 197 
  (26) (27) (27) 
     
Utilities  -49 -48 -25 
  (5) (5) (5) 
     
Furniture/  Appliances  20 23 27 
 (9)  (10)  (10) 
     
Clothing  -16 -16 -19 
  (5) (5) (5) 
     
Entertainment  -8 -6 -4 
  (7) (7) (7) 
     
Health  Insurance  -190 -199 -200 
  (4) (5) (5) 
     
Health  Care  6 5 3 
  (6) (6) (6) 
     
Education  67 60 46 
  (10) (11) (11) 
     
Alcohol and Tobacco  13  11  6 
  (4) (4) (4) 
     
Home Maintenance  -7  -5  5 
  (7) (7) (7) 
     
Interest  -38 -34 -32 
  (3) (3) (3) 
     
Personal Care  -10  -8  -8 
  (1) (1) (1) 
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Other 9  12  10 
  (8) (8) (8) 
Control variables included:       
Basic Y  Y  Y 
Employment and urbanicity  N  Y  Y 
Housing N  N  Y 
Sample  n  21,524 20,625 20,625  
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Table 6 
Differences in budget shares: uninsured versus insured, low spenders 
 







Quarterly spending  on:  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Housing $88  $80  38 
  (13) (14) (12) 
     
Food  In  40 34 34 
  (8) (8) (8) 
     
Food  Out  5 0 2 
  (6) (6) (6) 
     
Transportation -17  -7  1 
 (9)  (10)  (10) 
     
Utilities -22  -19  -3 
  (6) (6) (6) 
     
Furniture/ Appliances  9  11  13 
  (6) (6) (6) 
     
Clothing -2  1  1 
  (4) (4) (4) 
     
Entertainment  -4 -3 -1 
  (4) (4) (4) 
     
Health  Insurance  -111 -114 -112 
  (3) (4) (4) 
     
Health Care  0  -2  -2 
  (4) (4) (4) 
     
Education  35 35 39 
  (8) (8) (8) 
     
Alcohol and Tobacco  20  21  18 
  (5) (5) (5) 
     
Home Maintenance  -10  -9  -4 
  (3) (3) (3) 
     
Interest  -24 -21 -20 
  (3) (3) (3) 
     
Personal  Care  -4 -4 -3 
  (2) (2) (2) 
      
  39
Other -3  -1  1 
  (3) (4) (4) 
Control variables included:       
Basic Y  Y  Y 
Employment and urbanicity  N  Y  Y 
Housing N  N  Y 




Differences in budget shares: uninsured versus insured, middle spenders 
 







Quarterly spending  on:  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Housing -$14  -$21  8 
  (23) (24) (22) 
     
Food  In  31 26 23 
  (10) (10) (10) 
     
Food Out  -1  -3  -12 
  (8) (8) (8) 
     
Transportation  172 201 184 
  (23) (24) (24) 
     
Utilities -19  -19  3 
  (7) (7) (7) 
     
Furniture/  Appliances  20 22 23 
  (12) (12) (12) 
     
Clothing  -24 -21 -26 
  (6) (7) (7) 
     
Entertainment  -14 -11 -11 
  (7) (8) (8) 
     
Health  Insurance  -227 -234 -237 
  (6) (7) (7) 
     
Health Care  12  9  7 
  (7) (8) (8) 
     
Education 101  86  68 
  (12) (13) (13) 
     
Alcohol and Tobacco  25  20  14 
  (5) (6) (6) 
     
Home  Maintenance  -23 -22 -15 
  (8) (9) (9) 
     
Interest  -31 -27 -26 
  (5) (5) (5) 
     
Personal Care  -12  -10  -9 
  (2) (2) (2) 
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Other  4 5 6 
 (9)  (10)  (10) 
Control variables included:       
Basic Y  Y  Y 
Employment and urbanicity  N  Y  Y 
Housing N  N  Y 




Differences in budget shares: uninsured versus insured, high spenders 
 
  Regression coefficient on “uninsured” dummy 







Quarterly spending  on:  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Housing  -419 -406 -220 
  (89) (91) (85) 
     
Food In  10  9  7 
  (30) (30) (31) 
     
Food  Out  -36 -46 -53 
  (26) (27) (27) 
     
Transportation  673 668 457 
  (131) (133) (131) 
     
Utilities  -58 -61 -26 
  (17) (17) (17) 
     
Furniture/  Appliances  102 99 124 
  (44) (45) (45) 
     
Clothing 2  -3  -2 
  (21) (22) (22) 
     
Entertainment  -39 -34 -21 
  (33) (33) (34) 
     
Health  Insurance  -293 -312 -317 
  (17) (17) (17) 
     
Health  Care  41 35 33 
  (29) (29) (30) 
     
Education  51 65 15 
  (49) (49) (48) 
     
Alcohol and Tobacco  19  17  11 
  (13) (13) (13) 
     
Home Maintenance  0  -3  24 
  (32) (33) (33) 
     
Interest  -45 -38 -32 
  (12) (13) (13) 
     
Personal Care  -12  -10  -9 
  (4) (5) (5)  
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Other  3 19 9 
  (39) (39) (39) 
Control variables included:       
Basic Y  Y  Y 
Employment and urbanicity  N  Y  Y 
Housing N  N  Y 
Sample  n  5,381 5,302 5,302 
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Table 9 






   Insured Uninsured 
   Mean SD Mean  SD 
  
      
Share of total expenditures on:     
 Housing  (total)  0.261 0.149 0.282 0.163 
  1. Rent and ownership expenses  0.199 0.172 0.249 0.179 
   1a.  Rent  0.180 0.176 0.230 0.181 
    1b. Tenant’s insurance  0.007 0.019 0.003 0.013 
    1c. Housing for someone at school  0.005 0.041 0.008 0.044 
    1d. Lodging while on trips  0.004 0.012 0.002 0.009 
    1e. Rent received as pay  0.002 0.022 0.007 0.041 
  2. Property taxes  0.022 0.044 0.012 0.038 
  3. Mortgage principal payments  0.012 0.036 0.007 0.028 
  4. Mortgage interest payments  0.025 0.071 0.014 0.055 
  5. Special and lump-sum mortgage payments   0.000 0.007 0.000 0.004 
  6. Home construction and improvement  0.002 0.015 0.001 0.007 
      
Real expenditures on:      
 Housing  (total)  $867 $528 $844  $531 
  1. Rent and ownership expenses  651 584 736  562 
   1a.  Rent  592 594 678  563 
    1b. Tenant’s insurance  24 61 9  41 
    1c. Housing for someone at school  15 117 22  134 
    1d. Lodging while on trips  12 41 6  26 
    1e. Rent received as pay  8 78 21  125 
  2. Property taxes  74 146 37  117 
  3. Mortgage principal payments  43 126 22  93 
  4. Mortgage interest payments  91 261 46  193 
  5. Special and lump-sum mortgage payments   2 24 0  16 
  6. Home construction and improvement  6 49 2  25 
    
Number of rooms  4.7 1.7 4.3 1.8 
 
Housing tenure    
  Own home, no mortgage  0.170  0.376  0.081  0.273 
  Own home, with mortgage  0.208  0.406  0.117  0.321 
  Rent  0.555 0.497 0.692 0.462 
  Occupy home rent-free  0.026  0.160  0.051  0.220 
  Live in dormitory  0.040  0.196  0.059  0.235 
     




Detailed housing expenditures for low-expenditure households 













    Insured Uninsured Insured Uninsured Insured Uninsured 
      
Share of total expenditures on:     
  Housing  (total)  0.106 0.118 0.294 0.322 0.304 0.302 
  1. Rent and ownership expenses  0.033 0.039 0.026 0.034 0.301 0.301 
    1a.  Rent  0.010 0.027 0.005 0.015 0.285 0.281 
    1b. Tenant’s insurance  0.018  0.011  0.017  0.016  0.001  0.000 
    1c. Housing for someone at school  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.009 
    1d. Lodging while on trips  0.004  0.002  0.003  0.002  0.003  0.002 
    1e. Rent received as pay  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.004  0.009 
  2. Property taxes  0.065  0.069  0.048  0.048  0.001  0.000 
  3. Mortgage principal payments  0.001 0.001  0.07 0.079 0.000 0.000 
  4. Mortgage interest payments  0.002  0.003  0.144  0.16  0.001  0.000 
  5. Special mortgage payments   0.000  0.001  0.002  0.001  0.000  0.000 
  6. Home construction and improvement  0.005 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.000 
          
Real expenditures on:        
  Housing (total)  $337   $348   $1,041   $1,082   $996  $892 
  1. Rent and ownership  expenses  104 114  90 110 989 890 
   1a.  Rent  34  78  18  48  936  829 
    1b. Tenant’s insurance  55  31  61  54  3  1 
    1c. Housing for someone at school  0  0  0  0  24  28 
    1d. Lodging while on trips  15  5  11  8  12  6 
    1e. Rent received as pay  0  1  0  0  14  26 
  2. Property taxes  206  201  171  159  3  1 
  3. Mortgage principal payments  3  4  244  259  1  0 
  4. Mortgage interest payments  7  11  513  549  3  1 
  5. Special mortgage payments   1  2  8  2  0  0 
  6. Home construction and improvement  16  16  15  4  0  0 
          
Number of rooms  5.5 5.2 5.5 5.3 4.2 4.1 
          




Housing expenditures for low-expenditure households: insured versus uninsured 
 









Dependent variable:  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Housing (total)  $88  $80  $38 
 (13)  (14)  (12) 
Components of housing expenditures:       
1. Rent and ownership expenses  129  131  20 
 (15)  (16)  (11) 
      
 1a.  Rent  122  130  15 
 (15)  (16)  (11) 
      
  1b. Tenant’s insurance  -8  -9  -4 
 (2)  (2)  (2) 
      
  1c. Housing for someone at school  4  0  3 
 (4)  (3)  (3) 
      
  1d. Lodging while on trips  -4  -3  -3 
 (1)  (1)  (1) 
      
  1e. Rent received as pay  15  13  8 
 (3)  (3)  (3) 
      
2. Property taxes  -13  -18  2 
 (4)  (4)  (3) 
      
3. Mortgage principal payments  -9  -11  4 
 (3)  (3)  (2) 
      
4. Mortgage interest payments  -16  -20  12 
 (7)  (7)  (5) 
      
5. Special and lump-sum mortgage payments   0  0  0 
 (1)  (1)  (1) 
      
6. Home construction and improvement  -3  -2  0 
 (1)  (1)  (1) 
      
Number of rooms  -0.3  -0.3  -0.1 
 (0.1)  (0.1)  (0.1) 
Control variables included in specification:       
 Basic  Y  Y  Y 
  Employment and urbanicity   N  Y  Y 
 Housing  N  N  Y 
Sample n  5,381  4,902  4,902  
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Table 12 
Transportation expenditures of the highest spending quartile: insured versus uninsured 
 
 
   Insured    Uninsured 
   Mean SD  Mean  SD 
     
Share of total expenditures on:     
 Transportation  (total)  0.240 0.191    0.321 0.253 
  1. Leased vehicles  0.013  0.045    0.010  0.043 
  2. New vehicles  0.059  0.158    0.064  0.181 
 3.Used  vehicles  0.070 0.153    0.157 0.244 
  4.Other private transportation  
  (Registration fees, tolls, rental cars, etc.)  0.007  0.011    0.007  0.012 
  5. Fuel and oil  0.033  0.020    0.033  0.028 
  6.Vehicle maintenance and repair  0.019  0.027    0.018  0.030 
  7. Vehicle insurance  0.024  0.021    0.021  0.021 
  8. Public transportation (includes airfares)  0.014  0.027    0.013  0.026 
            
Real expenditures on:        
 Transportation  (total)  $3,251 $2,839   $4,245 $3,590 
  1. Leased vehicles  178 606   136  562 
  2. New vehicles  848 2320   878  2511 
 3.Used  vehicles  961 2155   2081  3350 
  4.Other private transportation  
  (Registration fees, tolls, rental cars, etc.)  96 150   84  161 
  5. Fuel and oil  425 247   419  432 
  6.Vehicle maintenance and repair  249 348   224  400 
  7. Vehicle insurance  313 274   262  261 
  8. Public transportation (includes airfares)  181 362   161  332 
            
Number of vehicles  2.7 1.8  2.2  1.5 
     




Transportation expenditures for high-expenditure households: insured versus uninsured 
 
  
Total expenditure as control 
 





















Dependent  variable:  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
           
Transportation  (total)  $673 $668 $457    $430 $435 $289 
  (131) (133) (131)    (146) (148) (147) 
           
1.  Leased  vehicles  -25 -32 -38    -21 -30 -35 
  (31) (32) (32)    (31) (32) (33) 
           
2.  New  vehicles  -125 -216 -270    -269 -343 -366 
  (115) (116) (116)    (120) (120) (121) 
           
3.Used  vehicles  865 934 795    736 811 704 
  (113) (115) (115)    (115) (118) (118) 
           
4.Other private transportation   -5  -4  -7    1  1  -3 
  (8) (8) (8)    (8) (8) (8) 
           
5.  Fuel  and  oil  6 18 25    12 21 27 
  (13) (13) (13)    (13) (13) (13) 
           
6.Vehicle maintenance and repair  -3  1  -4    -1  1  -3 
  (18) (19) (19)    (18) (19) (19) 
           
7.  Vehicle  insurance  -42 -39 -40    -38 -36 -37 
  (14) (14) (14)    (14) (14) (14) 
           
8. Public transportation (includes airfares)  3  6  -3    10  12  3 
  (18) (19) (19)    (18) (19) (19) 
   
Number  of  vehicles  -0.4 -0.3 -0.3    -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 
  (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)    (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) 
Control variables included in specification:             
  Basic  (with  total  expenditure)  Y Y Y  N N N 
  Basic (with income instead of exp.) N  N  N  Y  Y  Y 
  Employment  and  urbanicity    N Y Y  N Y Y 
  Housing  N N Y  N N Y 
           
Sample  n  5,381 5,302 5,302  5,381 5,302 5,302 
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 Table 14 









Share on “basic needs” 
  






   
Uninsured Insured 
 (for  insured) 
Total 1.00  1.00  0.778  0.539 0.477    0.032
          
$2,000 0.020 0.063  0.303 0.604 0.504    0.035
$2,500 0.059 0.162  0.437 0.602 0.564    0.031
$3,000 0.105 0.269  0.485 0.600 0.554    0.037
$3,500 0.162 0.380  0.568 0.581 0.568    0.033
$4,000 0.221 0.474  0.645 0.586 0.538    0.038
$4,500 0.280 0.560  0.675 0.560 0.535    0.039
$5,000 0.334 0.625  0.737 0.561 0.534    0.036
$5,500 0.391 0.677  0.795 0.550 0.518    0.040
$6,000 0.446 0.728  0.793 0.515 0.509    0.037
$6,500 0.495 0.768  0.820 0.516 0.500    0.039
$7,000 0.543 0.801  0.847 0.463 0.484    0.036
$7,500 0.589 0.835  0.840 0.471 0.483    0.034
$8,000 0.630 0.856  0.887 0.466 0.474    0.035
$8,500 0.668 0.877  0.877 0.464 0.474    0.033
$9,000 0.702 0.891  0.909 0.464 0.469    0.030
$9,500 0.735 0.907  0.888 0.427 0.454    0.029
$10,000 0.763 0.918  0.915 0.388 0.443    0.028
$10,500 0.787 0.929  0.898 0.354 0.439    0.028




Share of expenditures on basic needs or necessities other than health insurance 
  
 Dependent  variable: 
 
 
Share on “basic needs” 
  Share on necessities other 
than health insurance 
      
Independent variables:  Coeff.  SE    Coeff.  SE 
Uninsured  0.08365 0.00482    0.07657  0.00472 
Total expenditures  -0.00002 <0.00001   -0.00002  <0.00001 
Total expenditures * 
uninsured  -0.00001 <0.00001   -0.00001  <0.00001 
Nonwhite  0.01841 0.00289    0.00309  0.00283 
H.S. Graduate  -0.00941 0.00353    -0.00267  0.00345 
Some College  -0.02190 0.00359    -0.01114  0.00352 
College Graduate  0.00672 0.00398    0.01562  0.00390 
Graduate Degree  0.00904 0.00450    0.00987  0.00441 
Age of Reference Person  0.00168 0.00009    0.00118  0.00009 
Reference person is female  0.00082 0.00257    -0.00227  0.00252 
Number of Adult Males  0.01163 0.00198    0.01269  0.00194 
Number of Adult Females  0.02361 0.00195    0.02073  0.00191 
Number of Boys  0.03086 0.00168    0.02342  0.00165 
Number of Girls  0.03040 0.00171    0.02503  0.00167 
Number of Babies  0.03256 0.00375    0.01707  0.00368 
 
Notes: 
1.  Sample size for both regressions is 21,524. 
2.  “Basic needs” are defined as food at home, housing and utilities. 
3.  Necessities are defined as food at home, food away from home, housing, utilities, alcohol 
and tobacco, interest, personal care and health care (i.e. all goods with elasticities with 
respect to total spending less than or equal to one, except for health insurance).  
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Figure 1 







































Regression-adjusted spending differentials: uninsured – insured households 





































Regression-adjusted spending differentials: uninsured – insured households 





































Regression-adjusted spending differentials: uninsured – insured households 





















































* is the level of total expenditures at which the uninsured devote a smaller share of their budget to basic needs 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Table A2 





Food In  0.317 
Utilities  0.388 
Health Insurance  0.390 
Alcohol and Tobacco  0.504 
Personal Care  0.572 
Housing  0.835 
Interest  0.730 
Food Out  0.873 
Clothing  0.870 
Health Care  0.992 
Entertainment  1.173 
Furniture and Appliances  1.259 
Other  1.296 
Home Maintenance  1.432 
Education  1.401 
Transportation  1.888 
Source: Author’s calculations from CEX data. 
 
  
 